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 The early Buddhist SËtras repeatedly refer to the Jainas. This has been known 
for more than a century. Hermann Jacobi (1895: Introduction), in particular, has shown 
that the position attributed to the Nigaˆ†has in the Påli canon agree with those found in 
the earliest texts of the Jainas. The Buddha and his followers are on various occasions 
depicted as being in discussion with followers of Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta, in whom we 
recognise the last T¥rthaµkara Mahåv¥ra. Mahåv¥ra himself never figures in these 
encounters. The event of his death, on the other hand, is used as an excuse to put some 
order in the Buddhist doctrine in the Sa∫g¥ti SËtra. If the Buddhist tradition is to be 
believed, the Buddha himself, before his enlightenment, did the ascetic practices which 
we can identify as typical for early Jainism; he abandoned them when he came to the 
conclusion that they did not lead him to the desired goal. A number of verses that are 
part of the Påli Buddhist canon show that the interaction between Buddhists and Jainas 
was frequent and, it would seem, intimate.1 
 These more or less frequent and intimate contacts between the early Buddhists 
and the early Jainas left their traces on the Buddhist doctrine as recorded in the ancient 
SËtras. This, at least, is what one is tempted to conclude. For these ancient texts ascribe 
statements to the Buddha wich directly contradict other statements of his. Moreover, 
some of these contradicted statements agree with positions which we know were held 
by the early Jainas. 
 Before we turn to any concrete instances of contradictory passages in the 
Buddhist canon that are sometime against, and sometimes rather in favour of Jaina posi-
tions, it is important to observe that the same ambiguous position can be found with re-
gard to other religious movements of that time. The main difference is, of course, that, 
whereas in the case of Jainism we have independent evidence allowing us to confirm 
and identify the beliefs [334] and practices concerned, the other religious movements 
criticised in the Buddhist canon are frequently only known to us through their 
depictions in the Buddhist texts. 
 Let me now give three examples of such religious practices that are criticised at 
one place, and accepted at another place of the Buddhist texts:2 The Mahåparinirvåˆa 
                                                
* I thank D. Seyfort Ruegg for some valuable observations. 
1 Gombrich, 1995: 1078 f. 
2 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993: x. 
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SËtra, in its various recensions, records a discussion of the Buddha with someone called 
Putkasa (in Sanskrit) or Pukkusa (in Påli). The Buddha here boasts that once, in a 
violent thunderstorm when lightning killed two farmers and four oxen nearby him, he 
did not notice it. Abilities of this kind were claimed by certain non-Buddhists, 
according to the testimony of the Buddhist texts. Another Buddhist SËtra (the 
Indriyabhåvanå Sutta of the Påli canon and its parallel in Chinese translation), however, 
ridicules such ‘cultivation of the senses’ which leads to their non-functioning; the 
Buddha is here reported to say that if this is cultivation of the senses, the blind and deaf 
would be cultivators of the senses. 
 A second example is the following:3 The Vitakkasanthåna Sutta of the Majjhima 
Nikåya and its parallels in Chinese translation recommend the practising monk to 
‘restrain his thought with his mind, to coerce and torment it’. Exactly the same words 
are used elsewhere in the Påli canon (in the Mahåsaccaka Sutta, Bodhiråjakumåra Sutta 
and Sa∫gårava Sutta) in order to describe the futile attempts of the Buddha before his 
enlightenment to reach liberation after the manner of the Jainas. It is tempting to 
conclude that these Jaina practices had come to be accepted by at least some Buddhists. 
This second example concerns a detail of certain Jaina practices, it would seem. I do 
not, however, know of passages in the Jaina canon which prescribe this detail. 
 Our third example is clearer in this respect. It concerns practices which certain 
Buddhist texts explicitly ascribe to Jainas and criticise, and which are confirmed by the 
Jaina canon. In spite of this, they are a number of times attributed to the Buddha 
himself.4 A SËtra of the Majjhima Nikåya (the CËÒadukkhakkhandha Sutta) and its 
parallels in Chinese translation [335] describe and criticise the Jainas as practising 
‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’ and ‘non-performing of new actions’. 
This can be accepted as an accurate description of the practices of the Jainas. But 
several other SËtras of the Buddhist canon put almost the same words in the mouth of 
the Buddha, who here approves of these practices. It is, once again, tempting to 
conclude from this contradiction that non-Buddhist practices — this time it clearly 
concerns Jaina practices — had come to be accepted by at least some Buddhists, and 
ascribed to the Buddha himself. 
 So far I have presented some conclusions from my book The Two Traditions of 
Meditation in Ancient India. My friend Professor Richard Gombrich does not agree 
with all the conclusions of this book, and has taken the trouble of writing a reply, called 
"The Buddha and the Jains," which has been published in the Asiatische Studien / 
                                                
3 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993: xii. 
4 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993: x f. 
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Études Asiatiques.5 What I welcome in particular in his reply, is that, unlike some other 
scholars, he does not try to deny the significance of the contradictions which formed the 
basis of my arguments. Quite on the contrary, Professor Gombrich accepts that these 
contradictions constitute a problem, which require an explanation. He accepts my 
explanation of outside influence on early Buddhism for some cases; for others, 
particularly those that concern the Jainas, he offers a different explanation. 
 Gombrich comments in this reply on the three examples which we have just 
considered. With regard to the first of these, he does not exclude the possibility that 
indeed the Buddha's boast not to have noticed a violent thunderstorm "is merely the 
invention of a stupid hagiographer", as he puts it. An alternative explanation which he 
presents, is that the incident is historical, and was occasioned by the circumstance that 
the Buddha was not, at that moment, on his best form. In fact, the episode occurs just 
after the Buddha has eaten his last recorded meal, a dish of pork which has given him 
the dysentery which kills him; as a result he is exhausted and dehydrated.6 
[336] 
 With regard to the second example, the recommended practice to ‘restrain his 
thought with his mind, to coerce and torment it’, Gombrich comments: "I do not find it 
at all strange that a technique which, used by itself and taken to excess, turned out not to 
lead to Enlightenment, could be recommended by the Buddha as one of a range of 
methods for overcoming a particular difficulty". In his well-known humoristic style, 
Gombrich explains this observation with the following example: "Analogies from 
physical health are easy to think of: purgatives as a sole means of producing health are 
likely to do more harm than good, but there is nevertheless a sound case for using a 
purgative at a specific juncture."7 
 These two cases illustrate Gombrich's fundamental approach to the texts. Where 
possible, he takes them seriously, i.e., literally. I strongly support this approach. Texts 
which present themselves as historical accounts have to be taken as such until and 
unless there are overriding reasons to doubt their veracity. The difficulty, however, lies 
in the details, in the application of this principle to specific cases. Restraining one's 
thought with one's mind, coercing and tormenting it, presents a contrast with many 
other forms of Buddhist meditation, which are, unlike this practice, gentle. It is, 
moreover, explicitly rejected in some passages, and apparently ascribed to certain non-
Buddhists, probably Jainas. Are we really obliged to believe that this practice was 
                                                
5 Gombrich, 1995. In this paper only those of Gombrich's observations that concern the topic at hand can 
be considered. For a discussion of some further points, I refer to my contribution to the forthcoming 
volumes on Buddhism in the series Die Religionen der Menschheit (Added: see Bronkhorst, 2000). 
6 Gombrich, 1995: 1077. 
7 Gombrich, 1995: 1080. 
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recommended by the Buddha himself? In cases like this the principle of taking the texts 
seriously does not really help us, or not enough. One is obliged to ask whether in this 
case the reasons which plead against taking the text literally are not strong enough to 
desist from taking the text at its face value. There is obviously no hundred percent 
foolproof method to decide either way. Whatever position one takes, the opposite 
possibility is never fully excluded. This does not, however, mean that there are no 
rational ways to make a choice. We will come back to the question below. 
 Most of Gombrich's article deals with the third example given above. It would 
perhaps be more correct to speak of examples — in the plural — rather than of example 
in the singular, for a few SËtras ascribe to the Buddha, or to one of his pupils, 
statements to the extent that one should annihilate former actions and not perform new 
actions. Gombrich does not [337] deny that such statements are typical of Jainism, and 
not of Buddhism. Yet he believes that the Buddha actually uttered them. He presents as 
reason for this peculiar behaviour of the Buddha the latter's frequent habit not to 
contradict the points of view of his opponents, but rather to reinterpret them in a 
Buddhist way.8 
 In spite of an interesting analysis of a number of passages, Gombrich does not, 
even in his own opinion, arrive at a fully satisfactory explanation of the central 
problematic statement. The following citations from his article show this:9 
 
Finally, why the strange passage ... in which it is claimed that a Buddhist ‘does no 
new karma, and touch by touch puts an end to the old karma — expunging in this 
very life’?10 ... the idea that one can put an end to one's karma contradicts many other 
texts. ... Unfortunately I have no complete explanation. It is evident that the texts are 
corrupt: even the sentence quoted has no syntax, for from ‘expunging’ on we have a 
string of hanging nominatives. 
 
I also cite a part of Gombrich conclusion at the end of his article:11 
 
Let me sum up. I think that our wider knowledge of the Buddha's context and mode 
of preaching allows us to see that when talking to people who already adhered to a 
doctrine he tried to lead them into his way of thinking by first stressing the 
similarities between them and then subtly infusing new meaning into words and 
phrases. The texts preserve an imperfect record of this process, in general because 
they naturally preserve the gist of the Buddha's message rather than his precise 
words, and in particular because detailed knowledge of the doctrinal views of the 
                                                
8 In this respect Gombrich follows Ruegg, who states with regard to this position when attributed to the 
Buddha (1989: 143): "The connexion of such a teaching with the Buddha himself seems nevertheless to 
be rare. When it does occur, it is evidently to be explained by the fact that his auditor was a Nirgrantha 
and that the teaching was thus intended as an introductory salvific device ..." 
9 Gombrich, 1995: 1094. 
10 The Påli reads: so navañ ca kammaµ na karoti puråˆañ ca kammaµ phussa phussa vyantikaroti 
sandi††hikå nijjarå ... 
11 Gombrich, 1995: 1096. 
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Buddha's opponents was for the most part lost. In these suttas, two of which have 
preserved an important sentence about wearing out old karma, we have fragmentary 
reflections of a larger and originally more coherent account of how the Buddha 
converted (or tried to convert) Jains by twisting their own terms against them. ... we 
can conclude on the one hand that we have some clouded reflections of the Buddha's 
preaching style, and on the other that the texts as they stand are of later origin. 
[338] 
 Gombrich's careful formulation shows that his explanation of the contradictions 
in the texts he deals with is confronted with difficulties, which he ascribes to the fact 
that the texts are corrupt and of later origin. Instead of holding these difficulties against 
him, I will rather assume, for argument's sake, that Gombrich's explanation accounts as 
well for the contradictions concerned as does mine. In other words, we assume that 
there are two altogether different explanations which account equally well for some of 
the puzzling contradictions that occur in the early Buddhist texts. Is there a way to make 
a rational choice between them? 
 I think there is, and I will presently indicate how, in my opinion, a way out of 
this dilemma may be found. Before doing so, however, it is important to emphasise that 
the present discussion should not be an occasion for excessive polarisation of points of 
view. Historical reality is as a rule complex. We cannot discard the possibility that the 
contradictions under consideration owe their origin both to the teaching methods of the 
Buddha and to the vulnerability of later Buddhists to outside influence. If, therefore, the 
following lines present an argument in favour of the latter alternative, this is not 
automatically an argument against the former one. 
 The essential strength of the theory of outside influence is that it explains far 
more than the theory that bases itself on the teaching method of the Buddha. Above I 
mentioned three examples, all of which could be explained with the help of the same 
assumption: the assumption that Buddhism, early in its history, underwent the influence 
of other religious currents. We have seen that Gombrich, in order to explain these three 
examples, had to take recourse to three different stratagems. In the case of the first 
example, where the Buddha boasts about his abilities not to see and hear, Gombrich 
ascribed this to the poor physical state of the Buddha at that moment. Alternatively, he 
explained it as "merely the invention of a stupid hagiographer". The second example 
concerned "restraining one's thought with one's mind, coercing and tormenting it". Here 
Gombrich had to think of another kind of explanation: the practice is useful, if one does 
not carry it to extremes. The third example, finally, was explained with the help of the 
presumed teaching method of the Buddha. There are numerous other examples of 
contradictions which can be explained as resulting from outside [339] influence, which 
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have been dealt with in my book.12 Gombrich does not discuss these other cases, so I 
cannot say how he would explain them. It seems however likely that, as in the case of 
the three examples just discussed, he would come up with various different 
explanations. Given that one single explanation can account for all these cases, such 
alternative explanations create the impression of being invented ad hoc. 
 In the remainder of this article I will show that the theory which explains these 
contradictions as due to outside influence is far more homogeneous than it may look at 
first sight. I will argue that Buddhism, from a very early date onward, has been 
particularly vulnerable to one specific kind of influence. Most, if not all, of the cases of 
outside influence which we can, as it seems to me, discover in the ancient texts, are of 
this particular kind. 
[340] 
 In order to specify the kind of influences to which Buddhism has been 
particularly vulnerable, it is important to recall that Buddhism presented a way to put an 
end to the cycle of rebirths determined by one's acts. We can speak in this connection of 
the doctrine of karma. Buddhism was not the only religious current of its time that 
offered a solution to the problem posed by the doctrine of karma. It did, however, offer 
a solution which differed in various ways from the solutions offered by others. In the 
case of the other currents of the time known to us, the link between the problem and its 
solution was obvious. In the case of Buddhism, on the other hand, this link was not so 
clear, or perhaps not clear at all. As a result at least some members of the early Buddhist 
community tended to borrow such elements from other religious currents, which would 
help re-establish the link between the solution and the problem it was meant to solve. 
                                                
12 One of the conclusions arrived at, was that the four meditational states known by the Sanskrit names 
of åkåßånantyåyatana, vijñånånantyåyatana, åkiñcanyåyatana, and naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana, some (or 
all) of which appear to have been final stages of meditational exercises, are not authentically Buddhist. In 
this connection it is interesting to cite a passage from the Mahåvibhå∑å, in the French translation of Louis 
de La Vallée Poussin (1937: 161-162): 
 "En outre, l'expression ‘une vérité’, veut dire: ‘un nirodhasatya’, car le Bouddha veut condamner 
les autres [théories de la] délivrance (vimukti). En effet les hétérodoxes enseignent quatre délivrances: 1. 
La délivrance incorporelle qui est l'åkåßånantyåyatana; 2. la délivrance de l'esprit infini 
(anantamanovimukti) qui est le vijñånånantyåyatana; 3. la délivrance de ‘l'accumulation du pur’ qui est 
l'åkiñcanyåyatana; 4. la délivrance du ‘StËpa du monde’ qui est l'naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana. Le 
Bouddha dit que cela n'est pas la vraie délivrance (vimukti), la vraie sortie (ni˙saraˆa), mais l'existence 
dans la sphère immatérielle (årËpyabhava). La vraie délivrance est seulement l'unique nirodhasatya, 
l'absolu Nirvåˆa. 
 En outre, l'expression: ‘une vérité’, veut dire: ‘un mårgasatya’, car Bhagavat désire condamner 
les autres mårgasatyas. Les hétérodoxes enseignent en effet beaucoup de mårgasatyas. Ils pensent que le 
chemin est: 1. s'affamer; 2. coucher dans la cendre; 3. suivre le soleil (sËryånuvartana); 4. boire le vent, 
boire l'eau, manger des fruits, manger des légumes; 5. nudité; 6. coucher sur des épines; 7. ne pas se 
coucher; 8. se vêtir de haillons; 9. prendre des drogues et ne pas manger. Le Bouddha dit que cela n'est 
pas le vrai chemin; ce sont de mauvais chemins, des chemins contrefaits, des chemins décevants. Les 
saints ne les pratiquent pas; ce sont les mauvais qui y errent. Le vrai pur chemin est l'unique mårgasatya, 
le saint chemin à huit membres, vue correcte, etc." 
 Can one conclude from this passage that these meditational states where still known as being 
practised by non-Buddhists in the time of the Mahåvibhå∑å? 
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 Which were the methods taught outside the Buddhist community? Two of them 
are known to us. The one is, in the early period, primarily linked to the Jainas, the other 
is, for that same period, best known from certain Upani∑adic passages. Both are 
frequent in the more recent brahmanical literature. These two methods have one thing in 
common, the conviction namely that one can only escape the results of one's actions by 
somehow putting an end to all activity. The early Jainas, and many other Indian ascetics 
with them, applied this principle literally, and suppressed all bodily and mental 
activity.13 They would stand motionless for long periods of time, not reacting to any 
outside disturbances. The Jaina texts tell with pride how their spiritual heroes would not 
even react when tortured in various ways by curious onlookers, or by insects and other 
horrible creatures. The pains and suffering which these kinds of practices provoke were 
looked upon as signs that old karma was being destroyed. Once all the old karma 
destroyed, no new karma being added, it was sufficient for the ascetic to fast to death, 
motionlessly of course, and no new births would await him. 
 The other method shares the same essential concern. One can only be freed from 
the result of actions by not committing them. According to this second method, one has 
to discover that one is not identical with the active parts of the personality. All that is 
required is that one realise this important [341] insight. Once one stops identifying with 
the body and the mind, i.e. with all those aspects of the person that are active, one is no 
longer bound by the actions that have been committed by those parts.14 Usually this 
insight consists in the discovery of one's real self, one's soul, which is completely 
inactive by nature. Knowledge of the self has remained an essential, often the sole, 
ingredient of most doctrines of liberation that have been current in India. Virtually 
without exception, the self that has thus to be known is described as inactive. 
Sometimes it is stated to be identical with Brahman which, in its turn, is a non-agent; 
sometimes, such as in the classical Så∫khya philosophy and elsewhere, no such identity 
with Brahman is postulated, and it is rather the individual self, the puru∑a, which is said 
to be without activity. 
 These two methods of liberation are organically related to the doctrine of karma. 
They constitute, in a way, natural answers to the problem posed by this doctrine: 
Rebirth being occasioned by one's actions, only inaction can stop it. In spite of this, the 
early Buddhist texts contain clear evidence that both these methods were rejected at one 
point, most probably by the historical Buddha himself. The early Buddhist texts, to be 
sure, know the two methods just discussed, but they squarely reject them. On a number 
                                                
13 Bruhn (1993: 14) rightly points out that the discussion of this characteristic of Jainism has only 
started. 
14 This can imply the idea of liberation while still alive, which makes a hesitant appearance in the 
Upani∑ads; see Fort, 1994. 
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of occasions the Buddha is depicted as debating with Jainas, and as rejecting their 
practices. The Jainas are here described as "standing erect, refusing to sit down" and as 
experiencing "painful, sharp, severe sensations due to [self-inflicted] torture".15 In order 
to characterise the reaction of the Buddha to these practices, it is sufficient to cite the 
words that are put in his mouth after a discussion with some Jainas:16 "If, monks, the 
pleasure and pain which creatures undergo are due to what was previously done, 
certainly, monks, the Jainas were formerly doers of deeds that were badly done in that 
they now experience such painful, severe, sharp feelings." The method of bodily 
inaction evidently evoked a reaction of irony in the Buddha. But nor was he in favour of 
the method consisting in knowledge of the true nature of the self. We will consider 
some textual passages below. Let me first remind [342] you that — quite independently 
of the question whether the Buddha did or did not deny the existence of a self — no one 
has yet claimed, on the basis of the early Buddhist texts, that knowledge of the true 
nature of the self was the method preached by him. 
 Buddhism, then, accepted the doctrine of karma. Moreover, like the other 
religious currents that accepted this doctrine, and which constituted together what might 
be called the ßramaˆa movement, Buddhism looked upon the ongoing cycle of rebirths 
as thoroughly unsatisfactory, and accepted escape from this cycle as the highest 
religious aim. But the Buddha did not accept either of the two methods which most 
naturally fitted the problem connected with this doctrine. Buddhism preached an own 
method, different from those two. For my present purposes it is not essential that we 
know exactly what the Buddha's message consisted in.17 The Buddhist texts present, in 
fact, various methods, which are sometimes in contradiction with each other. The 
confused appearance of the early Buddhist texts is most easily explained by the 
circumstance that, from an early date, the Buddhists themselves were embarrassed by 
the fact that the solution presented by their tradition did not, or not clearly, fit the 
problem. This circumstance, in its turn, made Buddhism particularly vulnerable to the 
influence of the other methods, which fitted the problem admirably. 
 The three examples given at the beginning of this article illustrate this. They all 
concern the restriction of the mind, of the sense organs, or quite simply of all bodily and 
mental activities. The other examples which can be found in my book The Two 
Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India concern this same theme, and illustrate the 
attraction which this particular theme exerted on the early Buddhists. However, there is 
another theme which should be expected to have left its traces in the ancient Buddhist 
                                                
15 Bronkhorst, 1993: 26. 
16 MN II.222, Devadahasutta; tr. Horner, 1959: 10. 
17 This question will be addressed in my contribution to the first volume on Buddhism in Die Religionen 
der Menschheit, now under preparation. 
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texts. This is the theme of the inactive self, knowledge of which will liberate one from 
the cycle of rebirths. 
 Let me here, in order to avoid misunderstandings, point out that the Buddhist 
texts contain no indication whatsoever suggesting that the Buddha or his early followers 
looked upon knowledge of the true nature of the self as a method to obtain freedom 
from rebirth. It is even open to doubt whether [343] the very existence of the or a self 
was accepted by them.18 Many passages rather emphasise the non-self: the constituent 
parts of the personality are not the self. 
 Let us now consider the first sermon which the Buddha, according to the 
tradition preserved in the Vinaya, is supposed to have preached after his enlightenment. 
His audience is constituted by the group of five monks, his first disciples. I will quote 
some passages from the Påli version belonging to the Theravådins; very similar 
passages occur in the Vinayas of the Mah¥ßåsakas and Dharmaguptakas.19 We read 
here:20 
 
 "Then the Lord addressed the group of five monks, saying: ‘Matter (rËpa), 
monks, is not self. Now were this matter self, monks, this matter would not tend to 
sickness, and one might get the chance of saying in regard to matter, 'Let matter 
become thus for me, let matter not become thus for me'. But inasmuch, monks, as 
matter is not self, therefore matter tends to sickness, and one does not get the chance 
of saying in regard to matter, 'Let matter become thus for me, let matter not become 
thus for me'.’" The same words are then repeated with regard to the remaining four 
constituents of the person (skandha), viz. feeling (vedanå), ideation (saµjñå), the 
habitual tendencies (saµskåra), consciousness (vijñåna). The Buddha then continues: 
 "What do you think about this, monks? Is matter permanent or impermanent?" 
 "Impermanent, Lord." 
 "But is that which is impermanent suffering or bliss?" 
 "Painful, Lord." 
 "But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent, painful, of a nature to 
change, as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’? 
 "It is not, Lord." 
 
 The same words are then repeated, this time in connection with the remaining 
four constituents of the person. 
[344] 
 This passage neither proves nor disproves that the Buddha accepted the 
existence of the self. It is not the existence of the self, however, that is of particular 
interest here, but the conception of the self that manifests itself in these lines. These 
lines are about a self that is permanent, unchangeable and bliss. Such a conception of 
                                                
18 Claus Oetke's analyses in his book ‘Ich’ und das Ich have definitely shown, as it seems to me, that the 
early texts do not contain sufficient evidence to state that the Buddha did not accept the existence of the 
self, but nor can one say with certainty that he did. 
19 Translated into French by Bareau (1963: 191 f.) 
20 Vin I.13 f.; tr. Horner, 1951: 20 f., modified. 
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the self is well known from other, non-Buddhist sources. Indeed, the conception of a 
permanent, unchangeable self underlies the religious movements which I have just 
referred to, and which believe that insight into the true nature of the self is the 
necessary, or even sufficient, condition for the attainment of liberation from the cycle of 
rebirths. Their self has to be permanent and unchangeable, precisely because it does not 
participate in any actions. Some texts add that the self is bliss (ånanda) which 
corresponds to the sukha mentioned in our Vinaya passage. 
 I think it is justified to conclude, not just that the author of this passage knew the 
conception of a self that is permanent, unchangeable and bliss; but also, that he was 
acquainted with the method of liberation through insight into the true nature of the self. 
The present passage shows acquaintance with that method, and rejects it. It rejects the 
belief that it suffices to know the true inactive nature of the self in order to be liberated 
from the effects of one's actions. 
 The continuation of this same sermon has more surprises in store. Here the 
Buddha draws some conclusions from his earlier observations: 
 
Wherefore, monks, whatever is matter, past, future, present, or internal or external, 
or gross or subtle, or low or excellent, whether it is far or near — all matter should, 
by means of right wisdom, be seen, as it really is, thus: This is not mine, this am I 
not, this is not my self. 
 
The same is repeated with reference to the four remaining skandhas. The Buddha then 
continues: 
 
Seeing in this way, monks, the instructed disciple of the ariyans turns away from 
matter and he turns away from feeling and he turns away from ideation and he turns 
away from the habitual tendencies and he turns away from consciousness; turning 
away he is dispassionate; through dispassion he is freed; in the freed one the 
knowledge comes to be: ‘I am freed’, and he knows: Birth has been destroyed, the 
pure life has been lived, what was to be done has been done, so that there is no more 
return here. 
 
 Interestingly, this continuation of the sermon, having just rejected one liberating 
insight, introduces another one. For here the knowledge of not-[345]self is presented as 
a liberating insight. The concluding remarks of this passage of the Vinaya show this 
beyond any possible doubt: 
 
Thus spoke the Lord; delighted, the group of five monks rejoiced in what the Lord 
had said. Moreover while this discourse was being uttered (imasmiñ ca pana 
veyyåkaraˆasmiµ bhaññamåne), the minds of the group of five monks were freed 
from the intoxicants without grasping. At that time there were six perfected ones 
(arhat) in the world. 
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 In other words, the mere fact of hearing this wisdom proclaimed was enough for 
the five monks to reach Arhat-ship right there and then. No question of retiring into 
loneliness, of reaching subsequently the Four Dhyånas, etc., which are elsewhere in the 
Buddhist texts presented as essential prerequisites for attaining to this exalted state. And 
the liberating knowledge presented here is quite different from the one usually 
formulated in connection with the Four Dhyånas. Moreover, the very possibility of 
sudden enlightenment is denied in a passage that occurs several times in the early texts, 
and which reads:21 "Just as the great ocean dips gradually, ebbs gradually, slopes 
gradually and not suddenly like a precipice, so in my doctrine and my discipline, the 
access to perfect knowledge is achieved by gradual practice, a gradual action, a gradual 
way and not directly." 
 All this looks mysterious at first sight, but is really relatively easy to explain. 
For the knowledge of the not-self is, in its essence, hardly different from the knowledge 
of the self of the non-Buddhists. Why did knowledge of the self signify, for so many 
Indians, liberation from the effects of one's actions? Precisely because it implied that 
one is not identical with the active parts of one's personality, i.e., the body and the 
mind. Well, this is exactly what the knowledge of the not-self does for the Buddhists. It 
teaches that none of the constituents of the personality are the self. If we understand this 
to mean that one should not identify with these constituents, we come to the same kind 
of insight as that of the self for the non-Buddhists. A major difference is, of course, that 
an empty spot seems to remain there where the non-Buddhists believed to find a soul, 
but the effect of non-identification with one's actions is exactly the same. 
 I believe that this passage illustrates how a doctrine that was explicitly rejected, 
found its way into the Buddhist texts through a back-door. We [346] have already 
spoken about the reason why such a doctrine was apparently welcomed back by at least 
some Buddhists: because in the case of such an insight it was clear why it could 
constitute a solution to the problem posed by the doctrine of karma. The effects of 
action can only be avoided through non-action. Knowing that one's active parts are not 
really one's self, implies not being affected by the results of those actions. 
 
The thesis which this last case, as well as the ones considered earlier, illustrates, is that 
Buddhism was vulnerable to clear and direct answers to the problem of karma. To 
conclude, I will give two examples from later Buddhism, which are meant to show that, 
many centuries after its earliest period, Buddhism remained vulnerable to such answers. 
The first example is about the notion of an inactive self, the second one concerns 
physical and mental inactivity. 
                                                
21 Vin II.238; AN IV.200-201; Ud 54; tr. Harris, 1991: 75. See further Durt, 1994: 826. 
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 The idea of an inactive self continued to exert an attraction on the Buddhists. It 
finds expression in the so-called tathågatagarbha doctrine of Mahåyåna Buddhism. The 
similarity between the tathågatagarbha of certain Buddhists and the self of certain non-
Buddhists was so striking that one Buddhist text comments upon it. The following 
passage occurs in the La∫kåvatåra SËtra. The Bodhisattva Mahåmati addresses the 
following question to the Buddha:22 
 
You describe the tathågatagarbha as brilliant by nature and pure by its purity etc., 
possessing the thirty-two signs [of excellence], and present in the bodies of all 
beings; it is enveloped in a garment of skandhas, dhåtus and åyatanas, like a gem of 
great value which is enveloped in a dirty garment; it is soiled with passion, hatred, 
confusion and false imagination, and described by the venerable one as eternal, 
stable, auspicious and without change. Why is this doctrine of the tathågatagarbha 
not identical with the doctrine of the åtman of the non-Buddhists? Also the non-
Buddhists preach a doctrine of the åtman which is eternal, non-active, without 
attributes, omnipresent and imperishable. 
 
 The Buddha's answer does not interest us at present. An attempt is made to show 
that there is, after all, a difference between the tathågatagarbha of the Buddhists and the 
åtman of the non-Buddhists. The main point is that the two were so close that even 
Buddhists started wondering what the diffe-[347]rence was. Clearly, the idea of an 
inactive self had maintained its attraction for the Buddhists of this later period. 
 For the second example we have to leave India, and consider a controversy 
which took place within the Buddhist community of Tibet, in the 8th century of the 
Common Era. This controversy has recently been discussed by David Seyfort Ruegg in 
his book Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative 
Perspective. It seems likely that the position criticised in the third Bhåvanåkrama of 
Kamalaß¥la is the teaching which he ascribed to the Chinese master Mahåyåna and his 
numerous Tibetan followers. It runs as follows:23 
 
A certain [teacher] has the following opinion: "It is because of the force of good and 
bad deeds (ßubhåßubhakarman), produced through mental construction (cittavikalpa), 
that sentient beings (sattva) revolve in the round of existences (saµsåra), 
experiencing the fruits of deeds (karmaphala) such as heaven (svargådi). Those who 
on the contrary neither think on anything (na kiµcic cintayanti) nor perform any 
deed whatever are completely freed (parimuc-) from the round of existences. 
Therefore nothing is to be thought on (na kiµcic cintayitavyam), nor is salutary 
conduct (kußalacaryå) consisting in generosity and the like (dånådi) to be practised. 
It is only in respect to foolish people (mËrkhajana) that salutary conduct consisting in 
generosity and the like has been indicated (nirdi∑†å)." 
                                                
22 La∫kåv(V) 2.137, p. 33 l. 10 ff. The word kartå at the end of Mahåmati's question has been corrected 
into akartå ‘non-active’; only this reading makes sense; it is moreover confirmed by the Tibetan 
translation (Taipei edition vol. 10, folio 86a), as I have been informed by T. Tillemans. 
23 Tucci , 1971: 13-14; tr. Ruegg, 1989: 93. 
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And again:24 "No deed whatever, salutary or otherwise, is to be performed" (na kiµcit 
kußalådikarma kartavyam). We find here ideas which in early Buddhism we could 
attribute to the influence of Jainism and related currents, but this time in a country, 
Tibet, where there were no Jainas. 
 It is beyond the scope of this study to address the question whether perhaps the 
Tibetan controversy was, in the end, due to the influence of Chinese, such as Taoist, 
ideas, which might have been introduced into Tibet by the teacher Mahåyåna, who was, 
after all, a Chinese himself. Nor can we deal with the question whether the conception 
of the tathågatagarbha which we find in the La∫kåvatåra SËtra has undergone the 
influence of Brahmanical thinkers; Ruegg (1989: 19 f.) thinks it hasn't, but his 
arguments may not be altogether compelling. The answers to these two questions are 
not essential in the present context. The questions themselves suffice to draw [348] 
attention, once again, to the most important conclusion which our reflections lead to: 
Buddhism did not borrow just anything that it happened to come into contact with. 
Quite on the contrary, Buddhism was susceptible to certain kinds of ideas. Buddhism 
was, one might say, structurally in need of a satisfactory answer to the doctrine of 
karma. When such solutions were present in neighbouring religious currents, some 
Buddhists at least were likely to borrow these solutions, or rather adjusted versions of 
these solutions, and absorb them into Buddhist doctrine. The possibility cannot however 
be entirely ruled out that in certain circumstances ideas of this kind — i.e. ideas 
concerning the non-active nature of the self, or concerning the need to practice mental 
and physical inaction — arose within Buddhism itself, without outside influence. 
 In conclusion we may return once more to the questions from which we started: 
What was the exact relationship between early Buddhism and early Jainism with regard 
to the central problem of karma and rebirth? And how do we explain the passages in the 
early Buddhist texts which proclaim practices similar to those attributed to the Jainas? I 
have argued that Jainism offered a very straightforward, and therefore satisfactory, 
answer to the problem of karma. Buddhism did not. The effects are visible throughout 
the history of Buddhism. It was and remained susceptible to certain kinds of non-
authentic ideas and practices. Jaina-like practices, in particular, already exerted a great 
attraction upon the early Buddhist community. This in itself explains that such practices 
are occasionally recommended in the early Buddhist texts. No further explanation is 
necessary, as I have tried to show with the help of a number of examples. It is yet not 
impossible that the special teaching method of the Buddha made it even easier for such 
                                                
24 Tucci , 1971: 20; tr. Ruegg, 1989: 94. See further Ruegg, 1989: 141 f. 
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endorsements to find their way into the texts. Personally I see no need for this latter 
assumption, but nor do I see the need to deny its possibility. 
[349] 
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